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A Government of the Bourgeoisie's Third Party

AS the result of the new elections Britain once more rejoices in a Labour government. But, never before was a victory of the Labour Party so little a victory of the working class. The leaders themselves made no pretence of representing the working class. In their election campaign (and even earlier for that matter) MacDonald and his friends always spoke of the "nation," of "defending the interests of the nation," and condemned those who put forward the "class" slogan. The election programme of the Labour Party was deliberately drafted so that nobody could accuse the party of taking a class position. This was done to catch the votes of all who were dissatisfied with the Conservative government. And it was on this that MacDonald and his colleagues put the emphasis, not on slogans answering the needs of the working class. Five years of the Conservative régime were years of extortion, not only for the working class, but even for considerable strata of the bourgeoisie, and certain Conservative circles were beginning to be noticeably burdened by it. In the days when there was no

Labour Party such indignation would have struck a terrific blow at the Conservatives and would have brought a Liberal government to power with an enormous majority. It happened so at the elections held at the end of 1905. But then the Liberal opposition was considerably clearer than the present opposition of the Labour Party. In spite of its colourless and obvious endeavours to please a large circle of petty bourgeois electors as possible, the Labour Party could not attract such a mass of the latter as a Gladstone could have done. The Labour Party could only attract fortuitous elements of the bourgeois intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie, but it did not get even all the working class to put their crosses for its candidates. A detailed analysis of the votes cast in the industrial areas would undoubtedly show that part of the workers still remained in the bourgeois camp, and—particularly in those industries which enjoy protective tariffs—even voted for the Conservatives. Neither the victory of the Labour Party nor the defeat of the Conservatives was so great as various newspapers had

described. One cannot speak of the shattering of a Conservative Party which received only a few less seats than the Labour Party, and even obtained a higher aggregate vote. Nor can one speak of a crushing victory of a Labour Party, which failed to secure an absolute majority. In fact, as Baldwin observed, that, in line with British parliamentary traditions, the balance had only swung from one party to the other; and that party no more distinct from the first than were the Liberals in their time from the Conservatives.

The chief lesson of this election is in the fact that the Labour Party has presented itself to the whole world as a finally formulated third party of the bourgeoisie. It was not without significance that a correspondent of one bourgeois newspaper who had an interview with MacDonald the day after his victory, ended his article with the remark: "The British people [read: bourgeoisie] have nothing whatever to fear from MacDonald, he is too intelligent and too experienced to create any break by any superfluous hasty measures." The bourgeois correspondent is right. The MacDonald régime will bring no break with it, because it is the same régime that would have been established under a Liberal government. Liberalism has been wiped off the map because the workers have abandoned it and placed themselves under the new banners of their own party. But, inasmuch as the worker adherents of the Labour Party have been joined by innumerable bourgeois elements who have obtained the predominance in its governing circles, the situation has remained essentially the same as existed before its appearance. The distinction is merely that among considerable sections of the workers the illusion still remains that they have their own party.

THE British working masses have learned a great deal during the past thirty years, *i.e.*, since the day when the Labour Party was formed. But, under the influence of many centuries of parliamentary fetishism, they still believe in parliamentary opposition, and vote for it when the inglorious days of the party at the helm of government come to an end. In the present instance, an enormous mass of workers not only accepted the

old tradition of voting for the opposition because it was the opposition, but, whilst doubting the possibility of its fulfilling the promises of which it was so prodigal, preferred to vote for it in order the more surely to free themselves of the Conservatives. That some thing had previously happened with the Labour Party itself, at a time when the workers, who had again and again been deluded by the Liberals, none the less continued to vote for them in order to safeguard themselves against the black reaction of their opponents. A prolonged period of class struggle in the pre-war days, and then the even greater convulsion of the war itself, was necessary, in order to bring the Labour Party to the forefront of the stage and to make it the leading opposition. Before the Labour Party ceases to appear to be such an opposition and is thrust to the background, as has happened with the Liberal Party, new convulsions and new class struggles will be necessary.

It is quite natural, in such circumstances, that the Communist Party should not have been able to win a single parliamentary position during the election. With an undoubted leftward swing of large sections of the British proletariat, the desire to get free as soon as possible from the Conservative reaction was still greater than the indignation with the capitalist system generally; and as a result, the Communist Party, whose theoretical soundness was willingly recognised, did not obtain a tenth part of that support it could have obtained if the question of putting an end to that reaction had not occupied the first place in the minds of the British workers. The working class of Britain has still to be convinced of the miserable insignificance of the distance separating the Labour Party from the Conservative Party, before it realises the truth which the old Chartists preached—that it is easier and more expedient to tear up a rotten tree by its roots than to endeavour to cut down its useless branches and by grafting new scions seek to restore it.

UNDoubtedly, the MacDonald government will play no small part in the political education of the British working class. Its impotence, both in ideas and practice, will be its distinguishing feature. On every problem it will set up some organ-

isation for investigation, and on not one will it take a decision which would be in any way different from that which any Liberal bourgeois government would take. Evidently the central direction of its "transforming" activity will be turned to the sphere of foreign policy. It wishes to smooth away the dispute with America, which is seriously agitating the bourgeois circles in Britain, and will make an attempt to weaken the French influence in British diplomacy. But in both these spheres it will be convinced that its efforts are leading nowhere. The antagonisms between imperialist Britain and imperialist America are too deep and too much a matter of principle to make it possible to smooth them over with fair words. With the existence of that antagonism a "sincere agreement" with France is also impossible. But that in its turn involves a continuation of the same line in regard to France as was pursued of recent times by its predecessor. The only sphere in which it can shine by its initiative is that of relations with the Soviet Union. If it could restrict its task to the bridling of the working class one could expect it to vacillate and shuffle, as it did in 1924. But the fact that very considerable circles of the commercial and industrial world—including Conservative circles—stand for the speediest restoration of relations with the U.S.S.R. market, may give it courage and bring a decision for energetic action. It is true that on this subject MacDonald has more than once spoken equivocally, in a manner strongly reminiscent of his old phrase that he will not stand any "monkeying". Only recently he announced that he will endeavour previously to regularise the disputed issues with the U.S.S.R., those touching revolutionary propaganda and the old pre-war financial claims. But he can hardly hold back, for very long, from restoration of relations with Russia, and it is in this direction that one may expect some demonstrative gesture from him. Undoubtedly such gestures will be popular. One may even presume that the Conservatives themselves, headed by Baldwin, will secretly welcome the step, which will finally cut the awkward knot which they had tied. But the MacDonald government cannot hang on for long, on such popularity. It will lose its

popularity especially quickly among the working masses; for, the renewal of relations with the U.S.S.R. will not prevent, but on the contrary, will all the more stimulate it to the slander of the U.S.S.R. in order to please the bourgeoisie and to suppress any demonstration of solidarity among the working class with the Soviet Republic. And as the MacDonald government will do absolutely nothing for the workers in the realm of home politics, but on the contrary will act against them with no less resolution than in 1924, there will undoubtedly be a development of disillusionment among the working class. That disillusionment will to a certain extent be neutralised by the circumstance that the MacDonald government will still be without an absolute majority, and can always use the parliamentary situation, which, it will say, has not afforded it the possibility of working with the independence it had desired. And as the period of its tenure of government cannot be very long, in the new elections it will be able again to delude the workers with explanations concerning the past and with new promises in relation to the future; that is if in the meantime there is no intensification in the internal or external situation of Britain to accelerate the process of maturing the class-consciousness of the proletariat. But these intensifications are approaching. Britain's economic and political situation indicates that they are inevitable, for, the decline of industry and the consequent tendency of the capitalist class towards rationalisation, and the passing of the costs of this on to the working class, will inevitably lead to serious conflicts inside and outside the country. And under a Labour government endeavouring to please the bourgeoisie those conflicts will be bound to take on a particularly severe character and to create a revolutionary mood among the working class, this in turn undermining the position of the Labour Party just as in its time it undermined the position of Liberalism. In such circumstances the slogans of the Communist Party will find a response quite different from that of the present, and disillusionment with the Labour Party will lead to a mass withdrawal from it and the transformation of the C.P.G.B. into a mass party, into the leader of the British proletariat.

For the Forthcoming Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

(Discussion in the Trade Union Commission)

Piatnitzky's Opening Speech on the Organisation of the Unorganised : *

I DO not think it essential that we should discuss here the reasons which make it necessary to organise the unorganised, for we have the resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the Profintern, and the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, on that point. Moreover, there is already a considerable amount of literature on the estimation of the Ruhr strike; consequently, I shall now confine myself to one side of this issue only : that of how to organise the unorganised, before, during, and after a struggle, how to attract and keep them in the mass organisations under the influence of the Communist Party. During the consideration of this question in the political secretariat, there was some variance of opinion between comrade Lozovsky and myself. In considering the question of organising the unorganised we must first ask ourselves, in which countries can we obtain comparatively big results along this line?

Viewed from this aspect, the countries of Western Europe of interest to us, are :

1. France and Czecho-Slovakia, where we have our own Trade Unions.
2. Germany.

It is premature to speak of Britain at the moment, for the Communist Party of Great Britain is not strong enough to carry out the new tactics. The party is very small, and although it has influence in the Trade Unions, that influence is not so great as to enable it to put the decision as to the organisation of the unorganised into force. Consequently, I speak only of Czecho-Slovakia and France on the one hand and of Germany on the other.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AND FRANCE.

Speaking of Czecho-Slovakia and France it has to be frankly stated that neither the C.P.s nor the Red T.U.s will be successful in carrying out the new tactic unless they break with the old forms of organisation and methods of work in the parties and the Red T.U.s. In these countries the problem of organising the unorganised is very simple; we have Red T.U.s there, and if our parties and those unions were capable of carrying through the new tactic success would be assured. But what is lacking? The T.U.s have not got sound leadership. At the sixth and seventh enlarged plenums of the E.C.C.I. we criticised the work of the Unitary Confederation of Labour and the Czecho-Slovakian Red T.U. organisation. At that time the Profintern did not give us the necessary support, although all our proposals were accepted formally. We pointed out then that the Red T.U.s of France and Czecho-Slovakia worked little better than the Reformist T.U.s. It was thought then that such a summary was too severe. Now, three years later, the present leaders of the Unitary Confederation have come to the same conclusions. The fact that certain comrades of the Unitary Confederation and the Czecho-Slovakian organisation have realised the chief defects of their past work, does not ensure that they will not repeat those mistakes in the future. We became convinced of this in studying the lessons of the strikes in France, where, recently, big strikes actually began without the direct participation of the party or the Unitary unions; further, the active members of the Unitary unions have, in a number of cases, directly hindered the development of the strike. The same thing happened during the strike of the textile workers in Czecho-

* Speech made at the T.U. Commission during the session of 28/2/29.

Slovakia. During this strike, the leaders of the Red Union organisation took measures to ensure that the strike was really successful, but a section of the leaders, and the majority of the active functionaries of the Red Textile Union hindered the development of the strike. Moreover, individual workers of the union played the rôle of strikebreakers during the strike. Consequently, in regard to France and Czecho-Slovakia, the chief question is to see that there should be a change in the active personnel in the Red Unions. Only in such conditions will the C.P.s succeed in leading the strikes and drawing the broad masses into our unions.

THE POSITION IN GERMANY.

Now, about Germany. What steps have to be taken to ensure that the struggle can be waged successfully in Germany? (speaking, of course, of those enterprises and productions where there is a favourable situation for the declaration of a strike.)

What should our party and the T.U. opposition do in such circumstances? They must first organise committees, representing organised and unorganised, to prepare for the struggle. How ought these committees to be organised? Their membership should be discussed at meetings of the representatives of party nuclei and the trade union opposition in the enterprises in which the strike is anticipated. These candidates must be selected from organised and unorganised, and be proposed at general meetings of the workers in those enterprises. It is necessary to ensure that the factory committees are responsible for those meetings; but if this cannot be achieved, and if the T.U.s interfere, the meetings and elections must be organised without the factory committee and despite the trade union machinery. Committees covering a single town, county or region, must be elected at conferences of representatives of the committees in the various enterprises. This is the way in which the organised preparation for the struggle should proceed. When the struggle begins, those committees must call meetings of all the workers in the enterprise, and propose the formation of strike committees to direct the struggle, doing so by the same

methods as I have indicated above. As soon as the struggle ends, committees for aid of the victims of the strike, etc., must be organised in the same way. Thus a complete cycle of organisations will be created from the organised and the unorganised. These organisations report on their work to the masses who have elected them, thus keeping close to the masses.

CONSOLIDATING OUR INFLUENCE.

What is to be done with these committees after the struggle is ended? I propose, categorically, that they should be disbanded after they have reported on their work, for, committees for the preparation of the struggle, strike committees, and committees of aid to victims of the strike will disintegrate and lose their authority in the eyes of the masses if they do not find further tasks. What can we do then? The C.P.s must consolidate the influence they have won in this work. Those members of the unorganised, who have distinguished themselves during the struggle as revolutionaries, must be drawn into the party and the active personnel of the T.U.; thus strengthening the opposition inside the unions (by this I do not mean to suggest that it is not necessary to call the other unorganised workers into the unions). The militant elements which do not wish to join the unions must be drawn into the Red Front Fighters. The remaining, less militant workers, who have nevertheless assisted in the struggle, must be drawn into the Workers' International Relief, the Class War Prisoners' Aid, and similar subsidiary organisations. For instance, the active workers who have assisted the Workers' International Relief to distribute food to the strikers, etc., must be brought into the W.I.R. There are always victims during a struggle, through arrests, etc. The unorganised must be drawn into the work of the Class War Prisoners' Aid. If the W.I.R. carries on such an activity, it will acquire a new character, but not in the sense that it is reorganised on the basis of the factories, but in the sense that it becomes a mass organisation. It must begin to call regular general meetings, must report to them, issue mass literature, report on the assistance it has rendered during the struggle, and so on.

Hitherto, the organisations of the W.I.R. have been superficial organisations, which merely collected money. They must now be transformed into organisations of a completely different type: into organisations drawing in and retaining the broad masses of the unorganised workers as members. In Germany there is a complete network of organisations into which the masses of unorganised workers may be drawn and retained. This will be possible only if the C.P. of Germany takes an active part in this work and strengthens those organisations, and that in turn demands a certain reorientation in the work of the party itself.

THE FACTORY COMMITTEES AND REFORMIST T.U.S IN GERMANY.

I turn now, to a second, very important issue: that of the factory committees. What are the factory committees in Germany? They are organs which unite all the workers in a particular enterprise, and in certain places, even the workers of entire industrial combinations. In what way are the factory committees distinguished from the T.U.s in Germany? In one and the same factory there are members of three, five, six and more unions, whilst there is only one factory committee. If the C.P. of Germany were to conquer the factory committees, and transform them from miserable organisations, which to a considerable extent still follow the social democrats, into militant class organisations, occupied not only with questions determined for them by law, but acting also as organisers for the whole of the workers in the factory or works, they would then have organisations closely connected with the masses. Then, the factory committees would give the key to the conquest of the unions, would make it possible to struggle against the exclusions which are now being carried out. But the factory committees cannot take the place of the union. They can become only the foundation of the industrial unions in the enterprises. The proposal put forward in 1923 to the effect that the factory committees could replace the political soviets of workers' deputies and the unions, has been relegated to limbo: the factory committees have only definite functions inside the works. And now, instead of this, comrade Lozovsky is

proposing the organisation of "societies for joint struggle against lockouts," and "societies for mutual insurance against strikes."

Has the C.P. of Germany, say, the possibility of conquering the factory committees?

It has. The C.P.s have not exploited a tenth part of the possibilities which they have in this direction. But instead of directing the attention of the parties to the fact that it is necessary at all costs to exploit all these possibilities, before they pass to the organisation of new, parallel, unions, comrade Lozovsky proposes this latter road. We have Red unions in France and Czecho-Slovakia, but they haven't known, and still do not know, how to work. In Germany in 1923 we had a situation in which the workers left the Reformist T.U.s. Then we had so-called unions; separate, parallel, T.U.s which none the less did not attract more than a few dozen thousand members. This experience must show that one must approach this question of organising new T.U.s in Germany with double caution. And what is proposed? Instead of forcing the C.P. to work in the enterprises (despite the fact that it is difficult) they say: please go and organise insurance against lockouts, against strikes, which will constitute nothing more nor less than parallel unions. Tell me, isn't it necessary to continue the work in the reformist unions? You say the Communists haven't any possibility of working there? In my view that is incorrect. I take two facts from recent experience which show that all is not well with the reformists themselves. The shipbuilders' strike in Hamburg was ended at a conference by a majority of sixty votes (160 were in favour of ending the struggle, and 100 reformists voted against). And who were these 100 members of the conference who voted for a continuation of the struggle? They were also officials of the reformist unions, only they were subordinate officials who were connected with the masses. Knowing the mood of the masses they voted against the arbitration decision. In the Ruhr, too, at the metal-workers' delegate meeting, twenty-seven voted in favour of accepting the arbitration and fourteen voted against. This shows that in the reformist unions themselves there is a minority which is going against its leaders. If the Com-

munists do better work in the reformist unions, if they organise Communist nuclei in them, and the corresponding party centres render assistance to those nuclei, and direct them, the results will undoubtedly be still greater than hitherto.

THE CREATION OF PARALLEL UNIONS.

Should we now adopt the slogan for Germany: "abandon that work and join mutual aid societies"? I consider that dangerous, it is a proposal which will not withstand any criticism, one which we must fight against with all our strength. Comrade Lozovsky's proposal plays into the hands of the shirkers who do not wish to work in the enterprises and the unions; for them it is easier to organise new unions. It has to be borne in mind that when the reformists see that the Communists are drawing the unorganised into the struggle, they will also begin to work among the unorganised, in order to interfere with our work. Consequently we must work energetically to organise the unorganised in the spirit I have indicated.

The reformist leaders are transforming the unions into appendages to the employers' organisations, and consequently do everything to hinder strikes. The influence of the C.P.s, the sole defenders of the working class, must

increase with every day (provided we have intelligent work in the unions.) The reformists will not let the unions out of their hands without a desperate struggle, even though in the process they have to split and disintegrate them. I think that at a certain moment the C.P. of Germany may, with a development of the class struggle, and for the purpose of transforming the unions into fighting, class organisations, create parallel unions from the members of the reformist unions—members, who, at the call of the C.P. of Germany, will abandon those reformist unions. These unions will also draw from the unorganised workers. (These will be genuine unions, and not "societies for mutual aid against strikes or lockouts.") In order that such a policy be carried through successfully, we must previously strengthen our position in the factories, we must conquer the factory committees and transform them into organs of the class struggle, we must intensify the struggle with the reformists for influence in the existing unions. Given a revolutionary situation, during large economic and political battles, the C.P. of Germany may be forced to pass in practice to the creation of parallel unions.

I hope that my contribution may serve as an introduction to a discussion on the question of how to organise the unorganised.

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post free through any bookeller.

A. Lozovsky's First Speech *

BEFORE every plenum, before every congress, we repeatedly consider Trade Union tactics and after heated discussions we work out a single line for the whole international Communist movement. Why do we bring so much passion to these discussions? Because we are deciding the question of the methods of winning the masses over to the cause of the revolution. Those disagreements which arise are not disagreements in principle: they are disagreements between people who think alike, who are struggling in a united front against the right-wingers, conciliators and Trotskyists; disagreements over one question—the organisation of the unorganised. Such disagreements are quite natural in practical work, and in considering our tactics we must not be perturbed by the circumstance that some right or left-wing wanderer seizes one or another of us by the tail of his coat and attempts to exploit an isolated phrase or proposal for his own purposes. Let the “friends of Communism” and the anti-Communist elements disturb themselves over our discussions of vital issues,—they will not make any capital out of our disagreements. By their anxiety they show that they are incapable of independently facing up to a single question.

Now I turn to the essence of the question confronting us.

WHAT IS NEW IN THE SITUATION.

From the contribution which comrade Piatnitzky made to our discussion it follows that there is nothing new in the situation, that it is quite sufficient to carry on what we have previously been doing, to carry out what we have previously decided, and everything will be well. I do not doubt that if we had carried out fully the decisions of the First Congress of the Comintern, we should have resolved all the difficulties, because the chief decision at that congress speaks of the necessity for an international republic of soviets. Then we would, of course, have had no difficulties and these burning disputes would not have arisen.

Well, and according to the way in which comrade Piatnitzky enunciated the situation, there is no new element, but we have congress decisions, we have extremely good instructions and resolutions,—occupy yourselves with carrying them out, and the deed is done. That is the chief defect of his contribution. Comrade Piatnitzky offers us pills to remedy an earthquake, and as is well known, pills are of very little help in such a situation. Undoubtedly we have some kind of new period in the development of the class struggle. We should not be properly carrying out our task as leaders of the Comintern and the Profintern if we did not see that some kind of new phase has occurred in the workers' movement, in the class-relationships in the capitalist world, and that we have to adapt our policy to this new movement. Only that can explain the tactics which we adopted at the fourth Profintern congress.

What is the new element and what are the reasons which have compelled us again to raise the problem of the leadership of the economic struggle. The new element arises from the fact that the several years of intense application of capitalist rationalisation and the resultant intensification of class antagonisms, has engendered in the working class sufficient antagonism to enable them to pass from defensive to offensive battles.

In those battles, whether they be of defensive or offensive character, the whole machinery of social-democracy and the reformist Trade Unions constitutes a strike-breakers' organisation. In order to obtain the maximum improvement of their situation, the working class must act against the strike-breaking machinery of the reformist T.U.s, which has grown stronger with the growth of capitalist rationalisation. It is this strike-breaking which has grown stronger as a result of the growth of capitalist rationalisation, that has confronted us with the problem of the new tactic. We put forward new tactics at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. But does it follow from the situation as comrade Piatnitzky states it that it was necessary to propose

* Speech at the E.C.C.I. T.U. Commission, 28/2/29.

new tactics at that Congress? Yet there is no disputing the fact that we did propose and introduce new tactics. Was it not here, in this very hall, that we waged big discussions when preparing for the Ninth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.? And what were those discussions about? They circled around the fact that at that time we were aware of the new factor which had arisen in the workers' movement. We were groping for new tactics, for new methods of struggle; and at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern we applied the instructions of the E.C.C.I. Ninth Plenum, to struggle with all our powers to obtain an independent leadership of the economic struggle without and against the reformist unions. That is the new factor which we contributed at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. Does that follow from what comrade Piatnitzky said? Not in the least: form your nuclei, win the factory committees, win the unions, he declared. We know all that. But if that was all that had to be done, why did the decisions of the Fourth Congress put the entire revolutionary T.U. movement in the centre of attention? Why did the Sixth Congress of the Comintern confirm our decisions? Evidently there was some new element in these decisions, and Piatnitzky does not see that, he does not see the political changes which have occurred, and he has proposed that we should continue what we have been doing. In that case there was no point in the congress assembling, there was no point in estimating the new element which has been introduced by capitalist rationalisation, and there is no point in talking of the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Profintern.

But if comrade Piatnitzky stands by the point of view expressed in those decisions,—and he does stand by that point of view—it is quite incomprehensible why he does not take any step, or draw any conclusion from our decisions, why he gives no answer whatever to the problem of how further to direct the economic struggles. He has an answer: when you have won over all the workers in the factories everything will be fine. But we knew that even before the First Congress of the Comintern. And that is why I am not in the least satisfied with the answer which comrade Piatnitzky has vouchsafed.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNORGANISED.

I was represented by comrade Piatnitzky as proposing that instead of work in the Trade Unions and the workshops we should set up some sort of mutual aid societies. He represented it thus: we wanted to organise the unorganised, but we didn't want to work in the enterprises! But what are the unorganised,—“lumpenproletariat”? Hence he confronted us with the dilemma: either work in the enterprises or organise the unorganised. He literally said that instead of work at the enterprises it was proposed to occupy ourselves with the organisation of the unorganised and the setting up of mutual aid societies. As though the unorganised did not work in the enterprises!

In order to map out sound tactics for the imminent gigantic economic battles, we must take into account something to which Piatnitzky pays no attention whatever, namely, that, as the result of capitalist rationalisation, unskilled workers are now playing a considerably larger part in production, and the overwhelming majority of these workers are unorganised. The question of the unorganised workers did not arise because we had invented it. Piatnitzky must admit that the problem of the unorganised was different in 1925 from the problem as it presented itself several years ago. Everyone of us knows why this problem occupied chief place in the consideration of the Comintern and the Profintern. Capitalist rationalisation has brought changes in the various strata of the working class, unskilled labour, women and youths have been drawn into production, and the overwhelming majority of these new strata are unskilled workers; just as they have an important part in production, so also are they important in both economic and the political battles. It is impossible to direct the economic battles at the present moment without pondering over the problem of how to draw the unorganised into the struggle, even where there is a relatively high percentage of organised.

I remind you of the very interesting discussions which took place in Jena in 1913 between Rosa Luxemburg, Scheidemann and Huysmans on the question of the rôle of the unorganised in the political and economic battles,—of what was to be done with the un-

organised, and how. Scheidemann and Huysmans held the view that an unorganised worker and a backward worker were synonymous. Rosa Luxemburg argued that the experience of strikes shows that the unorganised play a considerable rôle, and that such a contemptuous attitude indicated a failure to understand the rôle of the unorganised and a lack of desire to stand at the head of the masses and to lead them into battle.

That is how Rosa Luxemburg answered Scheidemann at that time. Was she right? Yes, she was right. If you take the problem of the unorganised at the present time, it is quite evident that the situation has changed and that the matter has gone considerably farther, because the process of capitalist rationalisation during the last few years has effected enormous changes in the structure of the working class, and this category of workers has begun to play a dominating rôle in the process of production.

Our discussions have been most intense chiefly around the question of Germany. But permit me to remind you that Germany is not the centre of the earth. We take certain other countries and we see there that the question of organising the unorganised has come up against colossal opposition. During the preliminary consideration of this problem, before the Ninth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., was not my proposal to organise the unorganised in America subjected to an attack? Wasn't I called a schismatic when I proposed that in America the unorganised should be organised into new unions? That was in this hall in January-February, 1928.

Comrade Piatnitzky: I spoke in dependence upon the conditions.

Comrade Lozovsky: That was at the beginning of 1928. We discussed the question of whether it was necessary to organise the unorganised into new unions in America, and the entire American delegation was resolutely against the proposal. On this question there was unity between the majority and the minority in their delegation. They argued furiously, they argued foaming at the mouth, they accused me of schism, they put forward a whole series of manifestoes, theses, and so on. But when we raised the question, the Comintern recognised that in America it was

necessary to enter upon the organisation of the unorganised, upon the creation of new unions, because the majority of the working class was unorganised, because in the main spheres of industry the workers were unorganised.

If we ignore America and take a number of the European countries, so far as it concerns countries with a split T.U. movement, the issue would appear to arouse no question. There would appear to be no doubt that in France, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia, it is necessary to attempt to unite the unorganised around the revolutionary unions. But it is necessary to remember what colossal opposition we have had to endure in our parties even in these countries. And among the members of the Comintern and the Profintern views were expressed that the enrolment of new members and the consolidation of our ranks was in contradiction to the tasks of the unity of the T.U. movement, we overcame this with the greatest difficulty.

Now the issue would appear to be clear as it affects Czecho-Slovakia and France, *i.e.*, countries with a split T.U. movement. But if we take all the other countries, we find that the majority of the workers are unorganised. There are only a few countries in Europe where there is a more or less high percentage of organised workers.

I repeat that in regard to countries with a split T.U. movement there is no dispute between us. We all agree that in such countries it is necessary to organise the unorganised into the Red Unions.

But take the countries where the Union movement is not split. Comrade Piatnitzky outlined for us what, in his view, has to be done. First, it is necessary to work in the unions; secondly, it is necessary to work in the factory committees; thirdly, it is necessary to unite those who do not wish to join the unions in the International Workers' Relief and into the union of Red Front Fighters. That is fine. But what is to be done with all those who remain outside these organisations? Comrade Piatnitzky approached this question only from the organisational aspect, forgetting the political situation and giving an incomplete, unsatisfactory reply even from the organisational aspect.

The question is not as to whether we must continue the work in the unions, the factory committees, etc. Of course we must. If that is the only problem with which we are confronted we can cut the discussion short at once, for that issue was decided long ago. Neither is it the question of what we have to do in the T.U.s. That, too, is a question that was decided several years ago. Before us is the question of what to do with the unorganised, how are they to be united; but Comrade Piatnitzky, instead of answering what we are to do with the unorganised, whose specific importance is growing in the political and economic battles, gives us the address of certain organisations in the nature of the Red Front Fighters, or International Workers' Relief, and thinks that he has then solved the problem! Pardon me, but the problem is only just beginning at that stage.

TRADE UNION LEGALISM IN GERMANY.

In such countries as Germany we have now to start from two prerequisites which are very essential to our tactics. The first prerequisite consists in the circumstance that despite the decision of all the congresses, despite the decision of all the Comintern Plenums and the repeated indications of both Internationals, a considerable amount of fetishism exists in our ranks in regard to the Trade Unions. Legalism and constitutionalism still persist in regard to these organisations. "The Union has decided," "I hold a T.U. card,"—and the German Communist is immovable. This is most dangerous in regard to Communist tactics generally, but particularly so when we are adopting new tactics. This legalism, this vestige of bureaucratic psychology which exists in the working class, still has place even in our C.P.s and this is reflected most clearly in the right wing and the conciliators. It is also reflected in the everyday work of our party, where a considerable number of functionaries vote for the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Profintern and the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, but in practice do not apply 10 per cent. of those decisions, because their legalism, the fear of the bureaucracy, outweighs the rest,—and this is most dangerous from the aspect of the conquests of the masses. The

fear of expulsion often determines the line of conduct of many Communists in Germany. What prevents our party from winning the masses? Only this one thing prevents it. And amongst the right-wing this legalism has now been formulated into a complete theory. What is the philosophy of the right-wingers? They say: "We know that the unions ought to direct the economic battles. As there are unions in Germany, they ought to direct these battles." But this is the purest metaphysics, because those unions which exist in Germany do not direct the struggle, but sabotage it. And here we have the manifestation of fetishism, the failure to understand that the reformist unions are fetters on the workers.

I ask, where is the most backward, the most reactionary part of the working class to-day? That part of the working class which is organised in the reformist unions and follows the reformist leadership is the most consciously reactionary part of the working class.* In the process of struggle we succeed in wresting a certain part of the workers away from Social-Democracy, but now, the workers following Social-Democracy are sabotaging the movement. From a number of examples we have had the experience of tens and hundreds of thousands of unorganised workers moving ahead of the workers organised in the reformist unions, who have been held back by the gigantic union machinery. Furthermore, the unorganised frequently move ahead of certain Communists, who are enchained by Social-Democratic ideology.

HOW SHALL WE FIGHT THE EXPULSIONS?

The second very essential prerequisite is that a split in the unions in Germany is approaching. To fail to see this is to commit a crime against the German proletariat. There are two ways out, two possibilities of avoiding a split: carry out the policy of the right-wing Communists, and then our adherents will not be expelled. If we submit to all the rules, they will not expel us. But if we carry out the line which we ought to carry out on the basis of the decision of the Profintern and Comintern, we shall be expelled not in dozens and hundreds, but in thousands and

* Concerning this formula, see Com. Lozovsky's second speech.

tens of thousands. We are moving towards this. Many Communists do not realise that we are moving towards this. They are so afraid of the possibilities of a split that they do not wish to think of this theme; they do not want to see the circumstance that the Social-Democrats will expel thousands of Communists and revolutionary workers. Of course the Social-Democrats will carry out these expulsions intelligently; they will exploit thousands of methods. But there are Communists who will then say: let the Communists be expelled in thousands, but the workers following us must remain in the reformist unions. If we consider the situation like that, we shall not see the majority of workers under our leadership.

We are confronted with the clear prospect of a split in Germany, and to do nothing to prepare our party, to prepare our ranks for the necessity of placing themselves at the head of parallel unions in the events of mass expulsions by the reformists would mean that we should be caught in confusion, and would be shattered for several years to come. And the views held by many comrades will not lighten our party's preparations for those battles, they will not help our party to survive the mass expulsions and splits and to retain its influence on the masses.

What must be done to ensure the retention and even extension of our influence among the masses during the intensification of the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the social democratic elements and reformists? In what direction must we travel, what tactic has to be adopted in Germany? In Germany we have only a kernel of organised Communists in the unions. Every Communist nucleus acts through one or another party organisation. But the T.U. organisations which are under our influence (the districts and local sections of the unions) have no inter-connection: they are connected politically, but not organisationally. In Germany we do not possess a broadly organised opposition inside the reformist unions. We have only organised party factions, which are interconnected by party discipline and party instructions. But those non-party workers inside the unions who follow us, who support our slogans and tactics, who vote for our candidates, and follow us in

the economic battles, are not organisationally connected with us or among themselves, and every blow at the C.P., every expulsion of Communists, organisationally severs the Communists from both this mass of workers organised in the unions and from those workers who are outside the unions, but who move with us politically.

The first step in Germany ought to be the organisation of a revolutionary opposition, the consolidation of all the opposition on the basis of local organisations: if we have twenty local sections behind us in the metal-workers' unions, thirty organisations in the chemical-workers' union, fifty organisations in the miners' union, etc., the first task is to organise these local organisations industry by industry on an all-German scale, to unite them in what form you like. But it must be done at once; it is our preliminary task.

When the opposition is organised and closely connected with its Communist vanguard, the expulsion of one or two thousand Communists will be considerably more difficult, for it will involve the expulsion of tens and hundreds of thousands of workers who follow us. And this is not done in Germany because one can hear such arguments as: "We shall begin to organise the opposition and we shall be expelled for doing so. Then a split is inevitable." If we approach the question from this angle we cannot stir a foot.

Before me is an article from *Vorwaerts*. "A revolutionary opposition against the Unions." In that article there is talk of the struggle against the Communists' new tactics for directing the economic struggles. On the basis of an analysis of the Social-Democratic press I assert that by raising the problem of independent direction of the economic battles we have struck Social-Democracy a deadly blow. And consequently they will attempt to hit back, to seize us by the throat. Here we must either retreat or advance further. That is why the problem of the unorganised is closely connected with our new tactic. If we wish to carry out an independent direction of the economic battles and to put forward our independent lists in the factories, we must be ready for mass expulsions and splits.

But how much time was absorbed in attempting to overcome the fear of the Ger-

man C.P. to putting forward independent lists! Do you think, comrade Piatnitzky, that we have now got over that fear? Not in the least. We have not got over it because the average German Communist officials who vote for the decision of the Fourth Congress of the Profintern, think to get out of revolutionary work by this vote, thus, when the question of work in the factories arises, or attempts are made to organise the unorganised against the Social-Democrats, they fail to take part in this. We have hundreds of examples. And you think that if we mobilise the entire party, so that every Communist should know now, by working through the unorganised, the entire reformist machinery can be beaten during elections or conflicts; this will be achieved without attempts on the part of the reformists to force a split? No. The line has to be continued for the independent leadership of the economic battles, or we must retreat. In the latter case all will be plain sailing, of course.

I maintain that what comrade Piatnitzky proposes will never get us forward. Of course there is nothing wrong in insisting that we have to win the factory committees, to work in the unions or subscribe to a hundred resolutions declaring that we ought to do this and that. That is not the question arising at the moment. No one ever denied all that. One has to be as brazenfaced as *Against the Current* to write that Lozovsky is proposing resignation from the unions. In my article printed in the *Communist International* I said that together with energetic work in the unions it is necessary to raise the question of what to do with the unorganised. But the right-wingers, wishing to draw a red herring across the trail, begin to clamour that I propose resignation from the unions. That is the purest bosh. I wish to give an answer to the question of how to organise the unorganised, and I want the comrades present at this session not to dodge that answer, for when comrades talk about International Workers' Relief that is no answer. They do not know what to do with the unorganised, and they give the address of the International Workers' Relief, but they themselves do not believe that this can provide anything actual in the sense of uniting the broad masses of unorganised workers.

THE UNORGANISED AND THE REFORMIST UNIONS IN GERMANY.

During the Ruhr conflict our comrades put forward the slogan: "Unorganised, join the reformist unions," as though the reformist unions were better than the Christian and the Hirsch-Duncker unions. I consider that that slogan is unsound. It is a distortion of our line, and yields nothing! it deludes the workers; it is a diversion instead of a way out. Take the Ruhr for instance. During the Ruhr conflict 213,000 workers were locked out, of whom 64,000 were organised and 149,000 were unorganised. When we reproach the reformist T.U. bureaucracy with carrying on negotiations behind the workers' backs, with organising strike-breaking, with demanding compulsory arbitration, and simultaneously tell the workers to join these unions, every unorganised worker must regard us as maniacs. When we have to lead an army into battle we must not disorganise it, but when, during a battle, we tell the workers to join the reformist unions, it is equivalent to disorganising our own ranks.

Then what is to be done? If we possess a mass movement, even in such a country as Germany, where there are tens and hundreds of thousands of organised workers, the task consists in maintaining our influence with them, not only during but after a strike. What happened in the Ruhr? There they acted in exactly the way comrade Piatnitzky proposed. He made his prophecies on the basis of the past, he expounded what our comrades in the Ruhr had done. In his opinion this is the ideal, and we get the result that, standing at the head of a mass movement, having got tens of thousands of unorganised workers to follow us, we obtained only 1,500 new members for the party. A splendid acquisition! We obtained 4,000 members in the International Workers' Relief,—also an acquisition; and what further? Where are the rest? Where have the other tens of thousands of workers disappeared to? According to Piatnitzky's theory they are not to be organised, because to organise them connotes occupying ourselves with the "organisation of the unorganised," "instead" of "working in the enterprises." Then what are we to do in regard to the unorganised? Shall we again wait two or three

years, until there is another strike or lockout, for them to follow us? Then, after a fresh conflict, lose them again for several years, and so on. This sort of thing is no use to us, it is holding back from an active policy, it is floating with the current.

ORGANISE THE OPPOSITION AND FORM COMMITTEES FOR STRUGGLE.

When we work actively in the unions we win a certain amount of support, consequently we must take the following steps: first we must organise the opposition, *e.g.*, in the metal-workers' union, on an all-German scale; the same in regard to the miners and other industries. Thus we shall obtain a basis for resistance in every industry. Then we must take the next step and unite all the opposition in a single *bloc*.

Secondly: We must organise the tens and hundreds of thousands of unorganised workers; no economic conflict can be carried through successfully if we fail to mobilise and carry with us these unorganised workers. We shall try to organise them in associations more simple than are the trade unions. Here it is not the name that is important, but the fact that the Communists are uniting the unorganised and putting themselves at their head. I proposed to unite the unorganised in mutual aid societies in the case of a strike, or in societies for struggle against lockouts. You did not like the name. But why did you boggle at the name? The whole point of the matter is that under whatever name you like, under any trade mark you like, tens of thousands of unorganised should be organised. Either we direct them during economic battles or we are merely talking. I think our German comrades were not talking but genuinely worked with the unorganised. They received 1,500 workers into the party, 4,000 into the Workers' International Relief, and several thousands into the Red Front Fighters, but if as the result of an economic struggle they succeed in gaining another ten thousand, and unite them in order that henceforth they shall struggle in an organised way, that will be a gigantic step forward by comparison with the present situation. I ask you, which is better: to organise the unorganised in any society whatever under what name you

like, than not to organise them at all? I maintain that if you go to the average unorganised worker after a lockout, and say you have been thrown out of the factory, no one but we offered you any assistance, come and we'll organise some society, you will pay contributions and you will receive aid during conflicts, I think the unorganised will respond. If we organise a society for mutual aid during strikes, a society for struggle against lockout, we shall get those workers who were unorganised, and who will remain unorganised if we do not capture them.

But when this is proposed, you say: if you organise them you will have to leave the unions. Why? The unorganised workers must be organised in whatever way is possible. But you want to draw up an ideal plan for yourselves and receive all guarantees for the future. You say draw the unorganised into the reformist unions, put ourselves at the head of the unorganised, and conquer the Trade Unions. That is a scheme, an empty scheme, and nothing will come of it. We shall let another year go by, but sooner or later we shall have to occupy ourselves with this work if we wish to direct the T.U. movement.

Many comrades suffer from yet another doubt: what will come of all this! Possibly the result will be an independent union? Yes, possibly in the future an independent union will be the result, because in Germany, owing to the reformists, we are on the brink of a split; tens of thousands of workers will be thrown out of the unions by them.

Comrade Heller: According to your own argument, the unorganised are not all of them backward, but in certain instances they are the foremost of the workers. Why do you want to set up a primitive form for them?

Comrade Lozovsky: Among the unorganised there are both forward and backward elements. Inasmuch as we have the fact, which no one has refuted, that there is a change in the structure of the working class, that the unorganised are playing a big rôle during battles, and inasmuch as no one has shown that the tactics laid down by the Fourth Congress of the Profintern has given no results,—if all this is so, where have the tens of thousands of workers got to? If after the strike we had confronted these workers, who

had followed us, with the question of setting up an independent organisation,—let it be but a society for mutual aid—we should have had behind us part of the workers. But now, as a new struggle is beginning, we must win them again.

Are these tactics in contradiction with our tactics of winning the T.U.s? Not at all. There are evidently differences between us when we talk of the conquest of the unions. When I speak of conquering the unions I speak of the conquest of the majority of the workers; but certain comrades at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern spoke of the conquest of the reformist machinery, and there are still comrades who talk about the conquest of the reformist machinery.

Once we talk of the conquest of the majority of the workers, of the fact that the T.U. machinery is a strike-breaking machinery, it is quite evident that the further work for winning a majority of the workers in the unions, must be carried on energetically. But does this free us from other problems? The trouble is that many comrades think that in this way they settle everything. Work in the T.U.s is still not a complete answer to the question, it is only part of an answer to actual problems. The organisation of the unorganised is not solved by the slogan of winning the workers who enter the reformist unions.

My last point: From Piatnitzky's speech you got the following: look at France and Czecho-Slovakia, see the miserable state the work is in there. So don't create new unions! But is it any better in Germany? And if it is, why is it? You get to the conclusion that wherever there are revolutionary unions the situation is worse; and better where there are no revolutionary unions. That is where your argument leads you to. But in reality you have turned everything inside out. You did not put the question thus: where the party is weak, it is bad inside the reformist unions, and the revolutionary unions are bad also. Everything depends on the party, and not on the form of organisation, whether it is independent unions or opposition.

OUR INDEPENDENT LINE IN THE TRADE UNIONS AND FACTORIES.

Comrade Piatnitzky ended his speech by

suggesting that Lozovsky is proposing tactics through which work in the T.U.s and factories must be abandoned and the creation of new unions commenced. But that has nothing whatever in common with my proposal. I did not propose that we should renounce our work in the unions, but that we should increase it tenfold, should carry it on with still greater energy, at the same time giving an answer to the question of what we are to do with the unorganised. But you provide no answer to the question of what is to be done with those unorganised workers who march under our leadership. You will go on marking time for several months and then come to the same conclusion. There is no other way out. Our aim and task is to organise the unorganised by all means and with all resources, to place ourselves at their head, and to lead them into battle.

That is why it seems to me that comrades will do well not to paint terrifying pictures on the wall; also, instead of occupying themselves with inventing the idea that I want us to cease our work in the unions, should get my viewpoint well into their minds: Communists must work in the reformist unions, must work in the factories, must carry out independent tactics and simultaneously they must find an answer to the question of how to organise the unorganised. You have not given any answer; for the answer that the unorganised are to enter the reformist unions is no answer to the new problem. It is a repetition of the old slogan in a changed situation, and it will not withstand the least criticism.

A. LOZOVSKY'S SECOND SPEECH.*

Certain views put forward by Comrade Gusiev in the Trade Union Commission force us to concern ourselves seriously with several problems, even though the Comintern discussed them long ago. I will begin with the problem which determines all the rest: that of the tasks of the Trade Unions.

In his speech, Comrade Gusiev made statements along this line: the Red Unions are now set the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie; this is the task of the sec-

* Speech at the Second session of the E.C.C.I. T.U. Commission, 16th May, 1929.

tions of the Profintern. By this alteration the T.U.s are transformed into organs directing the mass political and economic offensives. In another part of his speech the speaker spoke with bitterness of the Red Unions being set the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie. Comrade Gusiev said all this with the special object of proving that I do not know either the ABC of Communism or the ABC of the T.U. movement, since I have given expression to such "heretical" ideas more than once in speeches and articles.

Hitherto we had thought that the revolutionary T.U.s were distinguished from the reformist unions by the fact that they did set themselves the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie, and that those unions which do not set themselves that task are reformist unions. So we had been taught hitherto, and until now this has been elementary to every Communist; we have been taught this during the whole ten years of the Communist International, and the Comintern taught it to the whole international workers' movement. And now, ignoring the decisions of all the congresses of the Communist International, ignoring the history of our party, ignoring the whole practice of the Comintern over long years of struggle, Comrade Gusiev declares that to set the T.U.s the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie is a deviation, is a retreat from the correct line. But with what then should the T.U.s concern themselves? With only the economic struggle? I maintain that that kind of formulation is a revision of the entire line of the Comintern, is a revision of Marxism, a revision of Leninism. I don't want to overburden the attention of the Commission by citing dozens of quotations from the decisions reached by congresses of our party; those decisions which were written on T.U. and on general issues by Lenin himself. But I cite only two quotations from the decisions of the Second and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern in order to show how muddled is Comrade Gusiev.

In the resolution of the Second Congress of the Comintern: "*The Trade Union movement, Factory Committees and the Third International*," par. 4, we read:

"Communists in all countries must join the unions in order to make them conscious organs

of the struggle to overthrow Capitalism and for Communism."

You see that from Gusiev's 'viewpoint the Second Congress of the Comintern formulates the tasks of the T.U.s unsoundly. But I must say that the Comintern remains stubborn in its "errors." In the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern we find the following "heretical" formulation:

"Trade Unions which do not set themselves general class tasks, *i.e.*, tasks directed to the annihilation of the capitalist system, are the best buttresses of the bourgeois order and bourgeois society, despite their proletarian composition."

THE ROLE OF THE TRADE UNIONS.

I could add considerably to the quotations and quote extracts from the decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Congresses of the Comintern, from all the plenums, and so on, but the foregoing are sufficient. If in the eleventh year of the Comintern, speeches are made which declare that the task of overthrowing the Bourgeois State is not that of the Trade Unions, the only explanation which I can find to it is that Comrade Gusiev wishes to discover some deviation, some syndicalism; or that someone is ostensibly usurping the functions of the Party. Comrade Gusiev ought to be awarded a prize for his invention. The Party and the Comintern are struggling for the leadership of all the mass organisations of the proletariat, the unions included. The T.U. is the gear for driving the non-party masses into the struggle against the power of the bourgeoisie. Why do we struggle for the leadership of the unions? In order to transform them into a weapon for the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, in order with their aid to realise the objects which the Comintern sets itself. Comrade Gusiev has openly maltreated the whole issue with the sole object of accusing me of some deviation or other. But even when setting yourself such a task, Comrade Gusiev, you need to be more cautious, you mustn't get confused over questions which have been settled for the whole international Communist movement. All this is as clear to a Communist as is twice two are four, yet Gusiev asserts that in my speech at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern on the question of the Programme of the Comin-

tern, I gave an unsound formulation of the question of the tasks of the T.U.s. My "unsound" formulation consisted in my confronting the Unions with the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie. The attempt to cover oneself behind the argument that something thrusts the Party into the back seat or mixes up the functions of the Party and the unions will not withstand the least criticism. In the eleventh year of the existence of the Comintern there is no point in repeating what is the ABC of Communism. And the primacy of the Party and its leadership of all organisations is an elemental truth for every Communist. When we say that the unions must set themselves the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie, we mean by that that it is a question of the revolutionary unions, and that only revolutionary Communist leadership can set itself such tasks. If the union does not set itself these tasks it is a reformist union, and consequently its leaders are reformists, not Communists.

The question of the place of the T.U.s in the class struggle of the proletariat is raised by this. It would have seemed that this question was clear to all Communists! But as Comrade Gusiev wishes to advance his doubts, or his errors, on this question, under the flag of the Comintern, it is necessary to speak of this matter. The starting point for us is the Party. On the eve of the October revolution, we had to settle, quite concretely, this question of the rôle of the unions in the general class struggle of the proletariat. Lenin said dozens of times at congresses, and not only T.U. congresses, but congresses of the Party also, that without the unions we could not have maintained the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, because the unions were the organisations which drew the non-party masses into the struggle and rendered the party's leadership of the working class, and the vast peasant masses, as a whole more easy. The Unions have their own specific tasks, of course, but the dispute between Reformism and Communism throughout the whole history of the international workers' movement, and long before the war, took the line of discussing the place which the Unions had to occupy in the general class struggle of the proletariat. On this issue there was a dispute between the

Radical wing of the old Social-Democracy and the professional union workers and those of the right-wing in the workers' movement. For we Communists there is not the least shadow of doubt that the party must lead, that it is the motive force, the inspiration, the leader of the masses, that the task of the Communist T.U. workers consists in bringing the Communist tactics, the Communist tasks to the non-party masses in a language which they understand, in expounding those same ideas and tasks in T.U. terminology, in popularising our Communist ideas, in drawing new sections and new members into the stream of the Communist movement in order to realise the tasks set by the Communist Parties and the Comintern.

THE REFORMIST AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNIONS.

As Comrade Gusiev evidently set himself the task of inventing something new at all costs, he has made yet one other discovery. That discovery consists in suggesting that the reformist and revolutionary unions are one and the same. That is what he said in his speech. If the reformist and revolutionary unions represent one and the same thing, why raise a partition and why conquer the reformist unions? In order to prove his argument Gusiev said that the Czech revolutionary unions and the reformist unions represent one and the same thing and that there is the same situation in France.

I must declare myself in the most decided fashion against such a distortion of facts. In Czecho-Slovakia a certain section of the workers which came over to us from Social-Democracy has turned back to them. In France there have been instances in which the leading comrades carried on an unsound, opportunist line. But since when have we identified the leading elements with all the membership? Even if there have been a number of opportunist errors in France, even if a certain number of former leaders have abandoned the revolutionary tactics in Czecho-Slovakia, does it follow that the reformist and the revolutionary unions are one and the same? Are theories of this type really going to bring any advantage to the Communist International? For if we take Comrade Gusiev's point of view, we have to delete al

the decisions of the congresses of the Comintern. Comrade Gusiev has a very original outlook on revolutionary and reformist unions. When it is a question of the reformist unions he distinguishes between the upper ranks and the membership, but when he speaks of the revolutionary unions he does not draw any such distinction. He asserts that the entire revolutionary union is not distinguished from the reformist union. If we set ourselves the task of winning the majority of the members of the unions, if we want to lead the masses, if we want to direct the unions, if we set ourselves the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie with the aid of the Trade Unions, how can we come to the T.U. Commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist International with that kind of declaration? I think it is dangerous to the highest degree. Why did Gusiev do it? In order to depreciate the revolutionary T.U. movement, in order to show that there is nothing outside the bounds of the reformist unions, and that that which does exist is in no way different from the reformist unions. He adopted all this in order to make unsound tactical proposals, which withstand criticism just as little as do his theoretical discoveries.

THE UNIONS AND THE STRIKE COMMITTEES.

In his speech, Comrade Gusiev raised the question of the relationships between the unions and the strike committees. He said that the unions are subsidiary organisations in relation to the committees of action. I ask first and foremost, what unions? The reformist unions? Obviously not. For in relation to the committees of action, which as you know, arise in revolutionary fashion, the reformist unions can fall into no kind of subsidiary situation whatever. That issue is settled not by theses but by the correlation of forces. So that evidently it is a question of the revolutionary unions, wherever we have such. Now listen to what we get as the result. We take on ourselves the initiative in setting up committees for struggle; then, having created committees for struggle, which in Comrade Gusiev's words are temporary, we subordinate the unions, which, also according to Gusiev, are permanent organisations, to these temporary organisations. What does

such a situation involve? It involves the revolutionary unions being thrust out of the field of struggle. When we formulated these same problems for the international conference on strike strategy, we pointed out that the revolutionary unions must prepare the conditions for the establishment of strike committees, must put their best and most active workers into them, must work in close contact with them, and so on. Why does Comrade Gusiev transform the unions into subsidiary, auxiliary organs?—he has not explained why. When he tries to give an explanation he relies on the argument that the unions organise only a part of the workers, whilst the committees for struggle organise all the workers. I should hardly have said that that explanation explains anything whatever. What are the committees of action that unite all the workers? If they unite all the workers of a certain factory or a certain area, does that mean that the revolutionary unions are to disappear or to be transformed into subsidiary organisations? All this is the purest of abstractions. Instead of a realist study of the economic battles, instead of an estimate of experience, both positive and negative, an abstract scheme is drawn up. All organisations are placed in a kind of table of precedent.

Instead of drawing lessons from the experience of the gigantic class struggle of the past year we are offered a scheme, and Comrade Gusiev thinks that the Comintern, instead of having a study of vital experience, can restrict itself to the creation of abstract, dead schemes. What is our main task when we set up committees of action? It is to transform these committees into genuine organs of struggle against the bourgeoisie and against the reformists. If the unions are in the hands of the reformists those committees for struggle are also organs for struggle against the reformist unions, for the latter act against strikes, sabotage them, and so on. But if there are revolutionary unions in the country, as there are in France, for instance, which prepare for the struggle, which do everything to ensure a successful consummation of the struggle, the committees of action, together with the revolutionary unions, have to carry out the tasks with which they are confronted. The committees, created with our aid and on

our initiative, must draw new sections of the workers into the revolutionary unions. The work and influence of the committees must be shown in a growth of the unions. For Comrade Gusiev himself says that the committees are temporary organisations, whereas the unions are permanent organisations. If the unions are permanent organisations and the committees merely temporary, then we get a table of precedent which you have established. We summon committees of action in order to draw all workers into the struggle, but we are interested in consolidating our influence, and that can be done only provided we reject such formulæ as Gusiev proposes. We need here not a table of precedent. From that aspect this abstraction would appear to elucidate something, but politically it gives us nothing whatever. (Gusiev: It is political, but you understand it bureaucratically.) Bureaucratism consists in constructing abstract schemes instead of vital life, and life rides roughshod over those schemes. I ask, is Comrade Gusiev's presentation of the issue a step forward? Does it help our Communist parties in the sense of defining the tasks, in the sense of eliminating a number of disputed and altogether insufficiently elucidated problems? Does it provide those parties and those Communists who have still only a small experience, with the possibility of exploiting international experience, exploiting the positive and negative sides of our struggle, and of applying it to this or that country? Obviously not.

TRADE UNION LEGALISM.

The next question is that of trade union legalism. Comrade Gusiev is against T.U. legalism. But what is T.U. legalism? Where does it begin and where end? How are we to struggle against it? All this comrade Gusiev leaves unexplained. I quote one passage from his speech concerning Czechoslovakia. When Hais organised the "putsch" in the I.W.F. the Czech comrades were confronted with the question of what to do in the matter. The machinery was in Hais's hands, the bourgeois law was on his side. Our comrades raised the question that if Hais, enjoying the support of the State, retained the I.W.F. for himself, we should have to create new unions, inasmuch as the great majority of

the workers were on our side. Comrade Gusiev was against this, he considered that it would be possible to knock Hais out of his position by exploiting the statutes, as though, in accomplishing his coup, Hais did not know that he was committing an anti-statutory act. Comrade Gusiev was against a revolutionary decision of the question. He was for subjection to Hais. This is what Gusiev said at the T.U. Commission:

"I regard the question of the unions thus: There is a certain fortress, we are inside that fortress, but inside that fortress there is also a redoubt, a last refuge, a tiny inner fort. And Hais has planted himself inside that fort. Our task consists in organising the worker masses to storm that fort. It appears on the basis of the constitution that this is possible. There is a clause which says that one-third of the membership of the union can demand the summoning of an extraordinary congress, and the administration is obliged to comply. Meantime, the overwhelming majority of the union membership is in our hands. We have only to call one-third, and within six weeks we can call a new congress. But certain ardent Czech comrades tell us: 'You want to remain in one union with Hais, with the same Hais who has captured the offices, the money and so on. That is capitulating to Hais.' But we answer: To remain in the fortress which we had occupied cannot in any sense be capitulation. To abandon it would be real capitulation."

This military analogy with redoubts reminds me of the gases which are employed in warfare in order to throw a smokescreen of invisibility over everything. If you translate all this into the simple Russian tongue, it means: "Hais has carried out a coup, but we shall rely on the statutes. He has taken possession of the fortress and is exploiting the fact that the Bourgeois State and law are on his side. We shall not call a congress of revolutionary unions in spite of and against Hais, for we shall carry on our 'siege' although the overwhelming majority of the workers are on our side." Isn't that trade union legalism? Weren't the "ardent Czech comrades" right when they declared that inasmuch as Hais had carried out a coup, and violated the basic principles of proletarian democracy, it was necessary to summon a congress against him

and, if necessary, to change the name of the organisation, as Hais, operating through the police, wanted to keep the old name for himself and his officials. I have to add that the Comintern also accepted the viewpoint of these "ardent Czech comrades." In reality, what was the situation in Czecho-Slovakia? The overwhelming majority of the members of the unions were on our side, when Hais carried out a coup and seized the offices with the aid of the police. What were we to do? Wait until Hais was pleased to subject himself to the statutes? Isn't that T.U. legalism? Isn't that a failure to realise that we have to take into account not the statutes, not the legality, but that we have to apply revolutionary methods, as Bolsheviks do in such circumstances?

Our Czech comrades correctly pointed to the necessity of calling a congress of the I.W.F. against Hais as quickly as possible. We in the Comintern said to them: You wish to call a congress too quickly. Perhaps it would be better if you waited a month, in order to carry out preparatory work among the masses. Our comrades in Czecho-Slovakia did not entirely agree with this, but they carried out our advice. I allow of the possibility that we were not right, perhaps it was necessary to call a congress immediately. In any case one may dispute as to the expediency of calling that congress despite the constitution or the statutes within two weeks or a month, but there cannot be the slightest doubt that Gusiev's theory of the redoubt is a theory of passivity. That theory involves the recognition under any conditions of those who are at the head of the union, irrespective of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the members are on our side. I ask, what is the point now, in the eleventh year of the Comintern's existence, of inventing such a theory of "redoubts," a theory which ties our hands? Is it necessary to the International Communist movement? Not in the least. In practice that theory leads to capitulation. It is one of the innumerable abstractions unacceptable to the Comintern. Life forces us to take other roads. It forces us to break constitutions, to summon congresses against the will of the leaders. That is a matter of time, place, and circumstance. Consequently, any abstract

theory of that kind is dangerous, it confuses our party, it can only spread demoralisation among the ranks of the Communists.

THE QUESTION OF NEW UNIONS.

The next question to which I should like to draw your attention is that concerning the new unions. I have to enter into agreement with Comrade Gusiev on the issue of whether it is necessary to set up societies for mutual aid against lockouts, etc., in Germany. Let us grant that this is an error on my part, that it is not expedient to set up such societies in Germany at the present time. That is not a question of principle. On that question, as on all others, the final word belongs to the Comintern. It is the right of every one of us before the plenum to raise one problem or another, to consider them; the proposals may be accepted or rejected, but there is nothing special about all that. But what does Comrade Gusiev make of this issue? Instead of saying that it is inexpedient to set up this or that organisation in Germany, he pronounces himself altogether against any kind of new unions, formulating his argument thus: "In places there are also attempts to organise new unions." Thus he condemns any attempt to create new unions. But I must bring to the knowledge of the commission, and of Comrade Gusiev, the fact that not only are attempts being made, but in America new unions are already set up. I must further remark that this is in accordance with the decisions of the Ninth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. and the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. Are you against this or not? If you are against it, say so openly; if you are in favour, then say so openly, too. You have said that under certain conditions new unions may be set up even in Poland. On the question of new unions we need not general formulae, but we need definitely to say where, and what kind of unions are to be formed. To pronounce yourself altogether against new unions is to reject the decisions of the Ninth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. and the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. It means that you are declaring yourself against that which, in definite corresponding circumstances, it is expedient to do even in Poland, as well as in other countries. Your formula completely rejects the possibility

of setting up new unions. We may dispute whether to organise one or five unions, whether to organise them in this industry or that, or in Poland say. But we cannot now argue as to the principle; for we are not drawing up a "general" resolution with an unknown application. Our resolution has to be an instruction for the party. Can you go to our parties with that kind of general declaration? That would mean that we have to permit something which we have already done, as in the United States. Grant that little has been done, but that little is done on the decisions of the Comintern and the Profintern. We know that both the minority and the majority of the American C.P. declared themselves against the creation of new unions, but afterwards they had to admit the soundness of our position. Something real is expected of the T.U. Commission, not merely a general formula, but a practical answer to the question of what has to be done. It is necessary to point out the definite road and the best methods of putting our decisions into force.

ORGANISING THE UNORGANISED NOT ONLY A GERMAN QUESTION.

Further, on the organisation of the unorganised. On this issue Comrade Gusiev reproaches Merker, Hay, Heckert, and of course myself. What is the issue here? If we put the issue as Comrade Gusiev does, it will be an answer only for Germany, as Comrade Vasiliev rightly remarked. But the problem of organising the unorganised is not merely a German question. We are confronted with the gigantic world problem of organising the unorganised. There are countries with an illegal T.U. movement, there are countries with a split T.U. movement, and the Comintern will not start from the aspect of what happened in the Ruhr in resolving the problem of organising the unorganised for the whole world. Germany is of great importance; but on this problem one has to take the country into account, as well as the situation, the state of the T.U. movement, the extent of our influence, the number of organised, and so on. In regard to France, to Poland, the Balkan countries, Japan and Latin America, you cannot resolve this problem as you resolve it for Germany. I ask you, can we settle such a

world question just according to the German pattern, instead of studying experience, exploiting experience, and applying our own experience in accordance with the special conditions of each country? Obviously not! For if it is true that in many strikes the unorganised are no less active than the organised, and in certain cases even more active, it is also true that this problem is not only a German problem, and the larger the number of unorganised in any country the more vital this problem becomes for us. Can we crop them all with the same clippers? Let us grant that on this question, as it affects Germany, Lozovsky put forward an unsound proposal. Can we therefore draw the deduction that this problem does not exist on a world scale? Yet that is what Comrade Gusiev did. This question is actual and vital to the highest degree; all our parties are awaiting an answer. They want to know what to do, and how to do it; and all the new elements which we can contribute; the smallest grain of experience in this regard, is of enormous importance. Grant that on certain questions we are feeling our way; grant that in this regard we even make certain mistakes; an answer has to be given.

In connection with this I should like to touch upon yet one other question arising out of the relationships between the organised and the unorganised in the forthcoming struggles. In Comrade Gusiev's speech there is the sound statement that in a number of instances the unorganised were extremely active, and part of them have been ever more active than members of the revolutionary unions. Is it necessary to draw any conclusions from this? It seems to me that it is. How do you explain the fact that the organised, especially in the reformist unions, are less active than the unorganised? First and foremost it is explained by the gigantic pressure of the reformist organisations. The gigantic machinery of the unions sabotages, disorganises, demoralises the workers. The trade union and Social-Democratic organisations, and their press, act on the workers in the sense of propagating a renunciation of struggle, they enlarge the difficulties; stimulate in the workers distrust of their own strength; they adopt measures against the active elements, and generally transform the workers organised under their

control, into a brake upon the whole movement.

The second cause of the increased activity of the unorganised consists in the fact that there has been a change in the relationships of the various categories of workers in production. An enormous number of untrained and half-trained workers have been drawn into industry, and in the majority of cases these are unorganised. Capitalist rationalisation is establishing an objective situation favourable for their revolutionary development. The organised workers are in the great majority of cases skilled workers. They have a higher standard of existence, won over the course of a number of years. Thus what is the result? The skilled workers have won definite conditions of labour; the unskilled, unorganised workers, owing to capitalist rationalisation, find themselves under the gigantic pressure, and it is natural that they should reveal greater activity than the skilled workers who have passed through the reformist school. These conditions create the situation in which the section of the workers organised in the reformist unions are a brake upon further moves forward. In discussing this question, at one of the sessions I gave utterance to an assumption which may evoke a number of misunderstandings. I say, and I am not in the least afraid of saying openly, that on this question I gave an incorrect formulation, and that incorrect formulation has to be amended. I could only wish that Comrade Gusiev would do the same in regard to all the points in his speech to which I have referred. In my speech at the Commission on 28th February, there is the following passage:

"I ask, where is the most backward, the most reactionary part of the working class today? That part of the working class which is organised in the reformist unions and follows the reformist leadership is the most consciously reactionary part of the working class. In the process of struggle we succeed in wresting a certain part of the workers away from Social-Democracy, but now the workers following Social-Democracy are sabotaging the movement."

How much is there that is unsound and how much that is sound in this statement? The soundness consists in the statement that the

brake to the movement is Social-Democracy, that the section of the workers organised in the reformist unions lags behind the unorganised and lags behind because the organisation is in the hands of the reformists. The unsound part of the statement consists in the fact that such a formulation may give the impression that all the workers in the reformist unions are reactionary. I did not mean to imply that all the workers in the reformist unions are reactionary, and I did not think of saying that.

ARE THE UNIONS A DRAG ON THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT.

In Comrade Gusiev's speech is the following phrase: "According to Lozovsky the unions are now negative elements in the workers' movement." Which unions? If it is the reformist unions that are in question, I am convinced of the truth of that. I ask you: Is the American Federation of Labour a plus or a minus to the American workers' movement? (Gusiev: Both a plus and a minus!) Do us the favour of saying wherein it is a plus. You must add that the reformist unions of Germany are a plus to the development of the revolution in Germany. The history of the last ten years has demonstrated the contrary. You must add that the P.S.P. unions are a plus in Poland. I think the comrades do not fully realise all the importance of this question. With the growth of economic battles at the present time it is more advantageous to have to deal with a less organised section of the workers than with the more organised section, in so far as that organised section is under the influence of the reformists. If on the eve of 1917 there had been Menshevik unions, do you think it would have been easy to accomplish the revolution? Our plus was the fact that the overwhelming majority of the workers was not organised in reformist unions. We created unions in the process of the struggle and in the process of the revolution, and consequently they have quite a different appearance from the unions in the old capitalist countries. The minus in the German revolution was the fact that when that revolution broke out in 1918 there were a strong Social-Democracy and strong reformist unions there, which not only restrained the

development of the revolution but even sabotaged, undermined, the revolutionary movement and turned it into the channel of bourgeois democracy. This is why one has to approach the reformist unions, the P.S.P., the Christian-Democratic, the Hirsch-Dunker, the Christian and the rest, not from the abstract, not from the aspect of unions in general, but from the aspect of what they really represent at the present time. If we approach the problem from this aspect we have much to think about. The moment has arrived when it is necessary to define the formula of the conquest of the unions. There was a time when this formula would appear to have aroused no doubts whatever. But I maintain that so much material and so much disagreement has accumulated around the question of winning the unions that it is necessary to consider exactly what it means. What is the essence of T.U. legalism, which has found its clearest expression in the views of the right-wing in Germany? It is, that by the conquest of the unions, they mean the conquest of the union machinery, whereas we have always understood it to mean the conquest of the union members. Consequently, a clarification of the formula along this line can bring only advantage, and in this regard I am in agreement with Comrade Gusiev's further formula, because it says more exactly what has to be done and how it is to be done. (Moirov: But how can it without the machinery?) The conquest of the reformist unions is impossible, because the controllers of the machinery are reformists. We can dismiss the reformists from their positions; we can, if we have sufficient power, replace the reformists with Communists. But that is not conquering the machinery, that is knocking out the reformist operators of the machinery.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF CAPTURING THE REFORMIST UNIONS.

What are the possible limits to our conquest of the separate reformist unions? I think that in Gusiev's speech those limits are considerably overestimated. Experience has shown that where we win the majority of the workers the Social-Democratic officials drive out that majority, on the basis that the workers are in the union for the benefit of the reformist

bureaucrats, and not that the bureaucrats are there for the benefit of the workers. If we want to have a perfectly sound estimate of the direction in which the development of our unions will proceed, and of the further struggle with the reformist bureaucracy, we have to say: In those countries where the T.U. movement is still compact, where there are still considerable masses in the unions, a growth of our influence in the unions, and the consequent intensification of the struggle between us and the reformists will lead to a split, for the reformists do not intend to allow us to master the unions by democratic means. On this theme Comrade Gusiev has made very exhaustive statements. He reproached me for expressing the view that a split is near, even in those countries where it does not exist at all at the moment. He considered my assertion inaccurate, but he thinks so only because he takes no account of the facts. All the time he bases his views on Germany, he sees only one union and one area, he does not see or want to take into account what is happening in other countries. Is it true or not that during the last few months more than 2,000 selected persons have been expelled in Germany? What is the meaning of this? They are not expelling tens of thousands of workers, but they are expelling those the workers trust. As soon as a Communist is elected he is expelled. If a whole administration is conquered it is superseded by a commissary. We must decide the question of how we are going to support our comrades when elected. Shall we insist upon them remaining in office or shall we capitulate? If we stand by them, and if the masses support the expelled Communist, the reformists will not hesitate to expel a complete local organisation. Is that not a split, in your opinion? Are not those the splitting tactics which are now being applied to the water-workers by the reformists in Germany? Do not the events in Scotland show splitting tactics on the part of the reformists? Haven't the reformists split the Garment Workers' Union in Britain because the London section of that union engaged in and won a strike? If we want to struggle against expulsions and not surrender our positions we must carry the fight through to the end. I think our comrades in the Ruhr did

not act correctly in the question of the expulsion of the miners' union. They were late in their action. But in Berlin the water-workers' union took up a correct position. It is true that in the Ruhr also, our comrades recovered later, but all the same they let time go by. With the intensification of the struggle that situation will grow more frequent, not through any fault of ours, but it will grow more frequent. Failure to see that involves closing one's eyes and comforting oneself with illusions.

Further in his speech, Comrade Gusiev, not noticing the importance of the existing economic struggles, says: "Lozovsky does not see the new factor, namely, that economic battles are political battles, and that in the committees for struggle we have organisations of a new type, which unite the economic struggle and the political." This new factor which, ostensibly, I do not see, was expounded by me in those theses on strike strategy which were adopted at the Strasburg conference several months ago. It was expounded by me in a whole series of articles, and Comrade Gusiev knows that. For there are printed documents, and there is no point in attempting to maintain the assertion that I do not

understand the link between the economic and the political battles.

THE THESES FOR THE TENTH PLENUM.

Finally, the last question concerns the nature of the theses which we should prepare for the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

The Theses of the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. must deal with the problem of trade union tactics as they affect the most important countries. They must draw the lessons of our experiences during the struggles of the past few months. The resolution which we drew up for the International Conference on Strike Strategy, assembled all the experiences of the international strike movement, and should be adopted by the Plenum.

We do not need to deal with problems which were settled ten years ago, such as the rôle of the unions in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. That is not the problem which interests the International Communist Movement at the moment.

The task of the theses relating to the second item on the agenda: "On Economic Struggles," is to analyse our past experiences and guide all parties on the basis of those experiences. The theses must be definite, and they must be international in application.

C. Magyar's Report in the Political Commission of the E.C.C.I. on The Imperialist World and the Colonies

IN relation to the colonial question, the most important fact on the so-called third period is an extreme intensification of the struggle of imperialist countries for colonies, markets, sources of raw material, spheres of investment for capital export.

As for markets, the following figures indicate the position of the U.S.A. They refer to the export from the U.S.A. as a percentage of the total import of the country concerned :

	1913.	1926-27.
	%	%
India ...	2.6	7.9
Indonesia ...	2.1	6.5
China ...	6.0	16.4
Australia ...	13.7	24.6
Egypt ...	1.9	4.7

S. Africa	...	8.8	15.3
Brazil	...	15.7	28.7
Argentine	...	14.7	24.7
Canada	...	64.0	64.9

While U.S.A. exports to Europe increased by 135 per cent. in the period under review, those to the Far East increased by 350 per cent. The increase is qualitative as well as quantitative, for it was concerned to a great extent with industrial products. There has therefore been a great increase in America's exports to colonial countries.

During the war, and in the few years following, Germany did not export to the colonies, but the position to-day is shown in the following figures, referring to the same percentage as in the previous table :

	1913.	1926-27.
India	6.9	7.3
China	4.8	4.0
Egypt	5.8	6.3
Brazil	17.5	10.6
Argentine	16.9	11.4

This table shows that Germany has more or less regained her position in the colonial markets. England's share in colonial markets was as follows:

	1913.	1926-27.
India	64.2	47.8
Indonesia	17.5	15.1
China	16.5	10.2
Egypt	30.5	25.6
Brazil	24.5	21.2
Argentine	31.0	19.3
Australia	51.8	43.4
Canada	21.3	16.8
Africa	50.1	42.8

England's share in the most important colonial markets, and even in the British Dominions, has decreased greatly.

Japan presents the following picture:

	1913.	1926-27.
India	2.6	7.1
Indonesia	1.6	11.0
China	20.4	29.4
Australia	1.2	2.9

Japan has therefore greatly increased its share, particularly in India and Indonesia, but during 1928 suffered heavy losses in China.

France and Italy are competing fairly successfully in the Far Eastern markets, and in the Near East have made great progress at the expense of England. Before the war England accounted for the greater part of Turkey's imports, but this position has now been taken by Italy. We should, however, be incorrect in describing the situation as one in which England is on the retreat, while other countries, particularly America, Japan, Italy, France and to some extent Germany, are on the offensive. England is not on the retreat, but it is being beaten back, while making tremendous efforts to regain her former positions. In 1928, for example, England advanced in China at the cost of Japan; and development generally is pursuing an unequal, zig-zag course. The struggle is sharpest in the matter of textile exports, where the industrialisation of the colonies played an

important part. During the war, and in the first post-war years, a fairly large textile industry developed in the colonial countries, which is now competing with those of the imperialist countries. The U.S.A., Japan, Germany, England and the colonies, are all trying to win textile markets.

In the struggle for sources of raw materials, the share of the various states in the exports from colonial countries has undergone great changes:

<i>America.</i>	1913.	1926-27.
India	8.9	11.2
Indonesia	2.2	14.1
China	9.3	17.4
Egypt	7.9	14.1
Brazil	32.3	46.2
Argentine	4.7	9.1

<i>England.</i>	1913.	1926-27.
	%	%
India	23.5	21.0
Indonesia	17.5	15.1
China	4.1	6.5
Egypt	43.1	39.6
Brazil	24.5	21.2
Argentine	24.9	25.1

<i>Germany.</i>		
India	10.8	7.1
China	4.2	2.1
Egypt	12.8	6.5
Brazil	14.0	10.4
Argentine	12.0	10.4

<i>Japan.</i>		
India	9.3	13.6
Indonesia	5.8	5.3
China	16.3	24.5

These figures show that America's share of the exports from colonial countries has grown greatly, while that of England has decreased considerably. With regard to England, we must not forget that part of the raw materials which England imports from the colonies are not made up in England, but are again exported. Germany has not yet quite regained her pre-war position, but it is obvious that the tendency is in that direction. Japan, like America, has strengthened her position.

In the matter of foodstuffs, great changes have taken place since the war. It is no longer the colonies which supply the great part of the food for imperialist countries, but Canada, Australia, the U.S.A. and Argen-

tine. India's share in supplying food for England has been reduced to a minimum. The colonies are becoming ever more specialised in their cultivation. This means that the least fluctuations in the prices of these special products may be catastrophic for the colony concerned; such as would be the case with cotton in Egypt. Sugar and rubber are decisive for Indonesia, coffee, cotton and rubber for Ceylon, and rubber for the Malay States.

In the struggle for raw materials, England has in recent years suffered heavily as far as rubber is concerned, while America and Holland are fighting bitterly in the sphere of sugar production. Great efforts are being made to break England's monopoly in lead, and America is developing lead production in Bolivia with this end in view. The fight for petrol and copper is well known, and the struggle between English and American capitalists for the meat markets and cattle breeding areas has been accentuated in recent years.

The third period also marks an intensification in the struggle for spheres for capital export. England's average annual capital export, from 1890 to 1900, amounted to £36 million sterling, from 1900 to 1910 to £64 million sterling, and from 1910 to 1914 to £180 million sterling. Since 1924 there has also been a continual growth in England's capital export; in 1928 it amounted to £149 million, and is therefore reaching the pre-war level, although it must be remembered that the purchasing power of money has fallen by from 30 to 40 per cent.

Before the war France exported annually about 2 milliard francs, *i.e.*, about 400 million American dollars. In France, too, the tendency now is towards an increase in capital export. The U.S.A., which in 1919 exported 970 million dollars, exported in 1928 more than 1½ milliard dollars.

Comparing the figures, the average annual export of capital before the war in American dollars, was as follows: England, 900-1,000 million; France, 300-400 million; Germany, 80-100 million. The position now is as follows: England, 700-800 million dollars; America, 1½ milliard (it was practically negligible before the war); Japan, 80-100 million. I have no exact figures available for the other

countries, but their capital export amounts to something like 200-300 million American dollars.

Before the war there was therefore a total average annual export of 1½ milliard dollars, and the figure now is about 2½ milliard. Even taking into account the decline in purchasing power, capital export now is greater than before the war. In all probability it will continue to increase in the next few years. New countries are developing as capital exporters, particularly France, and Germany is beginning to do the same, while Holland and Switzerland are not entirely negligible in this respect.

Immediately after the war, the U.S.A. was the only great Power to export capital. At that time the struggle was not for markets in which to invest capital, but rather for capital itself; but now the old struggle for areas of development is beginning again, and increasing in strength.

Comrade Lapinsky contends that capital export to India and China has decreased for political reasons, that much capital is exported to Latin America, Canada and Australia, which are not colonies in the strict sense of the word; further, that Africa is becoming more important as a sphere for capital investment, and that in this question generally sharp differentiation is necessary. I accept all these valuable remarks without ado. He also raised the question of classification into colonies, semi-colonies and independent countries. This question still awaits an answer. I think that comrade Freyer propounded the problem of the character of the imperialism of the different imperialist countries correctly. Lenin described French imperialism before the war as usurious imperialism, but this has changed since the war. It is also true that American imperialism displays different characteristics from that of France or England; and much work must be done before we can arrive at any final description of the situation.

Together with this sharpening in the struggle for industrial areas of investment, there is an intensification of the struggle among shipping companies and among foreign banks in the colonies. Railways are fairly extensive in the most import-

ant colonial countries, and the fight is for an extension of markets, as well as for the existing ones. Plans have been made for large scale railway construction in India, Korea, and China, and there is also the French plan for the construction of the Trans-Sahara Railway, while the English are now building railways in Africa. Much work is necessary to extend markets, and this work is already partly in progress. New irrigation systems are necessary for many of the colonial countries, and work in this direction is being done in Egypt, India, Indonesia, Indo China and Korea.

The industrialisation of the colonies is at the present time experiencing a rather serious crisis in all important colonies, particularly China and India. But in spite of the crisis a certain growth of industry is taking place. Certain industries, formerly controlled by Indian or Chinese capital, are now controlled by or dependent upon foreign capital. For example the Chinese coal mining industry was controlled by Chinese capital to the extent of 60 per cent. in 1920, 50 per cent. in 1923 and 46 per cent. in 1925; in 1928 28 per cent. of the industry was controlled by Chinese capital and 72 per cent. by foreign capital.

In the textile industry in 1922 Chinese capital controlled 13,000 looms and foreign capital 8,000. The Chinese figure has remained stationary, but foreign capital now controls 16,000 looms. Foreign capital controlled 70 per cent. of the iron industry in 1923, and now controls 90 per cent. There has been therefore a certain growth of industry accompanied by an increase in the proportion controlled by foreign capital.

The same position holds good for India. I shall give examples from three industries: The Tata works, the greatest Indian iron works, are indebted to English capital to the extent of £2 million. I have no exact figures for the textile industry, but a German trade union enquiry reported that since the war English capital has gained control of a large part of former national industry. The manufacture of matches has developed greatly, but chiefly to the advantage of the Swedish Match Trust.

The Indian banking system experienced a most severe crisis in recent years, and

although there has been an absolute growth, the importance of English capital has increased more than proportionately. China's own share in Chinese shipping decreased from 27 per cent. in 1920 to 18 per cent. in 1927. Comrades Lapinsky and Gastron are right in protesting against the contention that these facts justify the statement that industry in the colonies is being denationalised. There is no such law of denationalisation; the post-war crisis in India and China account for the facts, which are themselves incontestable. Does this mean that the colonial bourgeoisie will in consequence become revolutionised? Not in the least! We must bear in mind the often parasitic character of the colonial bourgeoisie. Comrade Rubinstein remarked that, on this question of the industrialisation of the colonies, we have to fight against two sorts of deviation; against the theory of decolonisation, and against that which utterly denies the fact of the industrialisation of the colonies. The Sixth World Congress dealt with these two positions, but we must remember that the Brussels Congress of the Second International supported the decolonisation theory and there are tendencies in favour of that theory apparent within our own ranks. The theory must be decisively rejected. For us, who notice every new factory, every new point of proletarian concentration in the colonies, this theory that there is no industrialisation whatever of the colonies, is not a very serious danger.

The processes to which I have referred have occasioned important political changes, the greatest of which is an intensification of the struggle between England and the U.S.A. for colonies. America has recognised Egypt as an independent country without having come to an understanding with England on the matter. It was also the first great Power to accord *de jure* recognition to the Nanking Government of China. Formerly the U.S.A. verbally recognised China's tariff autonomy. When the Japanese in Shantung bought over the Chinese General Chan-Chun-Chan, and organised a rebellion, an American armoured cruiser was despatched to Shantung, and later the U.S.A. sent a number of advisers to China. Anglo-American hostility in China has assumed the form of a civil war between

two Chinese groups, the Nanking and the Kwangsi groups, America supporting the former, and England the latter. On March 8th Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons that a treaty was in existence which gives to England and America equal rights in the matter of railway construction in China. After this statement of Chamberlain, the newly-appointed American adviser to the Nanking Government, Mantel, declared that United States industry would take good care that China should be supplied with railway construction material from American industry only.

The Anglo-Japanese agreement is closely connected with the Chinese question. A few comrades dispute the fact of such an agreement directed against the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, and China. They think it probable that there will be an agreement between the U.S.A. and Japan. It is true that with regard to the Pacific Ocean we are confronted by extremely complicated problems. Fifty per cent. of Japanese exports goes to the U.S.A. and of this, 80 per cent. consists of silk. Japan needs American capital. Japan is competing with England on all Far Eastern markets, and particularly in China. The British dominions are hostile to agreements with Japan. The Singapore Base was built against Japan. All this is true, but we must make up our minds as to the principal contradiction and the principal question. In my opinion the chief question in the Pacific Ocean is China, and the U.S.A. is anxious to make China its colony. Japan will not allow this, even though it should lead to a new world war. Japanese imperialism cannot allow the existence of a united, semi-capitalist China as an American colony, both because this would involve Japanese rights in Manchuria, Korea and Formosa, and because—which is more important—the very existence of Japanese imperialism would be threatened. That is why I think that in spite of all contradictions, the main tendency is towards an Anglo-Japanese alliance and an Anglo-Japanese agreement concerning China. This tendency can be observed in the course of events taken by the civil war in China. This, however, does away with the competitive struggle between Japan and England as little as do the attempts of

the U.S.A. to break the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The struggle between the United States on the one side, and England and Japan on the other, will in the near future take on a more acute form in China because of the agreement with regard to the Banking Consortium. In 1912 Russia, Japan, England, the U.S.A., Germany and France concluded a treaty dealing with the division of the Chinese capital export market. In 1920 a new consortium of the most important banks in the world was formed, the banks of England, France, Japan and America. The consortium dealt not only with State, but also with industrial loans, and China was to be divided up, with regard to capital investment, among these four countries. The treaty was concluded for five years, but in 1925 it was prolonged until October, 1930. This second consortium was made on American initiative, and was directed against Japan.

The Americans are now making great efforts to monopolise China as a sphere for capital export. It has been reported that Kuhn and Loeb, a great American banking house, are negotiating for a loan to the Nanking Government of 400-500 million American dollars for the purposes of railway construction. An American banking group has bought the Shanghai Electric Works for 100 million dollars, an English group having an insignificant share in the transaction. (The Americans were forced to include the British group because the works actually belong to the British International Settlement.) There is no doubt that in the near future the struggle between America, and England and Japan, for China as an investment sphere, will become most acute.

A propaganda war is being conducted in India between England and America. The English commission distribute anti-Indian literature. The Americans turn out counter-literature in favour of India and against England. The Indian National Congress sent the famous poet Naidu to America, where she was accorded a great welcome. The Indian Nationalist newspapers are urging the export of American capital to India. Through Naidu, the National Congress raised its protest against England signing the Kellogg

Pact on India's behalf, and the American Senate accepted the protest. Porter, the President of the House of Representatives' Foreign Commission, declared that he failed to understand how England can represent India on the League of Nations Opium Commission. An article has appeared in an Indian newspaper, written by Coste, President of the National Congress Committee in the U.S.A., which points out that a war between England and U.S.A. is imminent, and that India must draw the consequences of this fact. The smaller countries are beginning to determine their attitude to the situation. Our Dutch comrades point out that until 1927 Dutch imperialism supported England and accepted its guidance; Deterding received all the naphtha concessions in Sumatra. Now the Americans are getting the concessions; and the Dutch are turning more and more to the U.S.A.

I shall deal with another question, which, although not very important at the moment, may in the near future play a great part. America imperialism has tried to introduce a sort of Wilsonism into its treatment of the colonial problem. A "pro-colonial" policy was adopted and American imperialism, in order to fight British imperialism and destroy the British Empire, coquetted with the National-reformist groups in the colonies. One of our most important tasks in fighting American imperialism is therefore to expose the truth behind this Wilsonism.

Since the Sixth World Congress relations between the colonies and the imperialists have become extremely strained. In Southern Morocco armed insurrections against French imperialism are taking place, for France is forced to carry on there, so to speak, preparatory political work for the building of the Trans-Sahara Railway. The Egyptian Parliament was dissolved and British imperialism is now exercising a fascist dictatorship in Egypt, based upon the landlords and compradores, and even the Reformist-Nationalist Party has been made illegal. In Syria, too, the Parliament—one can imagine the sort of Parliament that existed there—has been dissolved by French imperialism. The same has happened in Iraq; British imperialism is waging war on Ibu Saud. All these facts

show that the anti-imperialism struggle of the Arabian nationalist movement and of the national movements in Egypt, Iraq and Syria has become more intense. Since the Sixth World Congress there has been an armed insurrection in the French Congo, an area in which, since 1914, the French have actually reduced the native population by 30 per cent. The negro question in South Africa is also giving rise to great struggles, and a good deal of activity in the working class movement.

With regard to the other countries which are not quite colonial, but whose economy is still fairly colonial, a number of important phenomena are apparent in Turkey's development. I raise this question because in the Comintern we have for some time been considering the question of the Kemalist development. The problem concerns the fact that in Turkey the bourgeoisie has assumed the rôle of leading the revolution, that in Turkey the bourgeoisie has succeeded in getting the leadership of the peasants and in winning the formal independence of the country, and is trying to build up a national capitalism in the epoch of imperialism. Recently, however, Mustafa Kemal recognised the Ottoman debts and transferred the tariffs of Constantinople to the Entente imperialists as guarantee of payment. Turkish nationalism has therefore in a certain sense entered upon the path of capitulation to imperialism. Those comrades who warn us against our own simplification of this problem are quite justified. It would be a great mistake to state now, that Kemal has already become an agent of imperialism. On the one hand he is trying to exploit the differences between the imperialist States, and on the other he has an ally in the U.S.S.R.; but there are a number of economic factors which have forced him to give way to some extent to imperialism: Turkey to-day has no iron or coal, and then the Mosul oil fields were taken away; Turkey has had bad harvests for the last three years. It is obvious that in the period of imperialism it is difficult to build up an independent national capitalism in a small country. Mexico is an example of the difficulties confronting such an attempt.

The same phenomenon, although in different circumstances, is apparent in Afghanistan.

English capital has made a vigorous attack on the independence of the country. We know that British imperialism, to some extent exploiting the discontent of the peasantry, has succeeded in overthrowing Amanullah. The fights going on in Afghanistan may have fairly important results in Asia. It can be seen how England is stirring up antagonism to Afghanistan in Persia, where Britain has strengthened her position, and how counter-revolutionary bands are being sent from Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.

At the same time the Persian workers have taken up the struggle against British imperialism. On May the First the Persian workers organised, for the first time, a strike against British oil imperialism, in which 10,000 workers took part.

In Indonesia, Dutch imperialism after the suppression of the 1926 rebellion, carried out a series of reform-manceuvres in order to crush the revolutionary movement by reforms as well as by the white terror. In the so-called National Council, a sort of Parliament, the natives obtained the majority, which did not of course imply that Dutch imperialism's leading political positions were weakened. There still existed huge feudal landed estates, which are now beginning to disappear. A number of reforms—such as contract labour—were introduced, and the Dutch Colonial Minister even promised that in time Indonesia would be transformed into a sort of dominion of Dutch imperialism.

In Korea, since the Sixth World Congress, there has been an intensification of Japanese imperialist white terror, the arrest of revolutionaries, and reformist manceuvres, while efforts have been made to pacify the Korean working class with promises. Nevertheless, the first great transport workers' strike took place. It lasted eighty-two days and almost completely put a stop to the transport of commodities between Japan and Korea.

Japanese imperialism is carrying out an offensive in Mongolia, and Chinese counter-revolution, assisted by the reactionaries within the country, is making an attempt at intervention.

In China, the struggle among the imperialists is becoming much more acute, but they are also carrying out manceuvres directed

against the Chinese counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. China has attained so-called tariff autonomy, of course in words only, but on the basis of the new treaties it has the right of raising tariffs again in February; the extent to which this can be done depends naturally on the relation of forces. The U.S.A., as one method of dealing a blow at the imperialist countries in China, has entered upon negotiations with the Nanking Government on the subject of the extra-territoriality of foreigners. The hostility between the Nanking Government and the Kwangsi group is another manifestation of the growing strain in the relations of the imperialist powers. The most important fact of all, and one which grows clearer from day to day, is that American imperialism will try to make China a colony of American finance capital. All the new radio stations have been built by American capital. A few days ago an agreement was reached between the American Curtius group and the Nanking Government, which grants the group the concession to establish aircraft connections between Hankow and Canton, Hankow and Nanking, Nanking and Peking. American aeroplanes in China will be somewhat advantageous to American capitalism in the event of a war with Japan.

The English and the League of Nations are conducting an energetic struggle against these American attempts. Avenol, a League of Nations representative, was in China and declared that the League was prepared to support China materially as well as morally. The South Manchurian Railway has planned to invest more than 100 million yen in Manchuria in the next two years. Japanese capital in Shantung has acquired a number of important mines in order to strengthen its position in China.

At the Fifth Plenum of the Kuomintang in November, 1928, an alliance was concluded between the centre and the right wing. The petty bourgeois wing is being driven into opposition, while the Nanking and Kwangsi groups are fighting each other. Its inner political meaning is the struggle of the Chinese bourgeoisie, whose economic basis was strengthened in 1928, against the landlords, against extreme reaction. The Chinese bourgeoisie has put forward a reform pro-

gramme which was, naturally, in its own interests. The Kwangsi group put obstacles in the way of the execution of this programme. At the Third Congress of the Kuomintang the petty bourgeoisie was forced to put forward strong opposition. The forthcoming war between Nanking and Feng Yu San is the result of that circumstance, Feng Yu San representing the petty bourgeoisie. The breakdown of the counter-revolutionary united front, formed after the Canton insurrection, has become an accomplished fact. Nanking has not become the government of the bourgeoisie, but the influence on it of the bourgeoisie is very strong. However, the influence of the Nanking Government in China, and its international position, has become much stronger. As far as the working class movement is concerned, the Kuomintang has introduced a series of reformist manoeuvres and has at the same time employed terrorist methods against the revolutionary workers and Communists, who, when arrested, have been ruthlessly massacred. A number of yellow trade unions have been founded in order to restrain the workers from engaging in revolutionary struggles.

Latterly, however, strikes have increased in duration and stubbornness. In 1928 China took second place on the list of countries in respect of the number of working days lost by strikes. I think that the deepest point of depression after the Canton insurrection has already been passed.

With regard to the peasant movement the Kuomintang is conducting neither a bourgeois nor a reformist agrarian policy. Many stupid attempts have been made to realise in China the teachings of Henry George as understood by Sun Yat Sen; fiscal reforms have been drawn up, but no serious attempt made to solve the land problem. It is true that the Kuomintang has tried from time to time to "solve" the agrarian problem by primitive expeditions. Divisions, formed from the "lumpenproletariat," were set up in the villages. Recently, however, a number of peasant insurrections took place in Kiangsu under the leadership of the Shanghai workers; the unemployed town workers returning to their villages and organising peasant revolts.

The prospects for the immediate future are therefore a great accentuation of the contradictions between the imperialists, accompanied by and corresponding to an accentuation of the struggle among the various Chinese groups. The counter-revolutionary united front exists no longer, and the deepest point of depression in the working class and peasant movement has been passed.

In India, the contradictions between imperialism and the colonial world, as well as those in the country itself, are being greatly intensified. In 1928 thirty-one million days were lost in strikes, a fact which gives India first place on the strike list. About half a million workers took part, who put forward slogans for a general strike and a Socialist, Soviet, India.

In this year, too, a number of strikes have occurred in Bombay; the general strike of the textile workers is still going on. British imperialism is bitterly fighting the revolutionary movement, and is at the same time trying to disorganise the workers by reformist manoeuvres. The greatest effort is being made to isolate the peasants, in the hope of delaying their entry into the struggle. The Bombay Bill, which would have driven three million peasants from the land, has been withdrawn. In Bengal the right of hereditary tenure has been accorded to a new section of the peasantry. Taxes have been lowered in the Punjab and a Commission set up in Burma to enquire into high rents. A Royal Commission was appointed to study the conditions of the Indian workers. Female labour has been prohibited in a few industries. At the same time, however, the working class leaders are being fought with measures of extreme terrorism, and the most vile provocations and pogroms organised. But British imperialism has not succeeded in inveigling the working class into the Hindu-Mussulman struggles. The workers remained quite peaceful during the pogroms. All the parties of the national bourgeoisie have formed a united front and convened an "All Party Conference," at which the so-called Nehru constitution was accepted. This constitution means surrender to British imperialism. The Indian bourgeoisie has renounced its claim to independence, it has

admitted its guilt, it has recognised the right of British imperialism to command in foreign policy. This constitution was accepted by the Congress of Swarajists, who also manœuvred a number of attacks on the petty bourgeoisie; they founded an Independent League, and Nehru's son, Jawaharlal Nehru, promised the Indian petty bourgeoisie, independence, abolition of the large estates and of usury, and even nationalisation of the large factories, etc. Now all these petty bourgeois phrasemongers have capitulated to the bourgeoisie. At the Swarajist Congress they voted in favour of Gandhi's resolution accepting the Nehru constitution. The Indian bourgeoisie has transferred the management of the anti-Communist law to the Commission, and has also declared itself in favour of the anti-Trade Union Law. It is obvious that the Indian bourgeoisie has made great progress in the direction of a rapprochement with imperialism.

About 30,000 Bombay workers carrying their own slogans, demonstrated against the Simon Commission. In Calcutta 20,000 workers demonstrated during the Swarajist Congress in favour of a Socialist India. The revolutionary textile workers' union in Bombay increased its membership from 300 to 65,000 in three months. Trade unions grow like this only in revolutionary times. There were also political strikes after the arrest of workers' leaders. At the Trade Union Conference, Nehru, popular with the petty bourgeoisie, received 36 votes, and a revolutionary worker 29 votes. At the Railway Workers' Congress the resolution of the revolutionary opposition in favour of a general strike was almost passed. These facts indicate a powerful radicalisation of the working masses.

The disproportion in the movement is one of its negative aspects; the struggles took place mostly in Bombay, which accounted for 25 out of the 31 million days of strikes. The largest section of the Indian proletariat, those working on plantations, are for the time being still quite peaceful. The influence of the revolutionary elements has certainly grown, but fairly large sections of the working class and fairly important trade unions, are still under reformist influence. A petty bourgeois

ideology is widespread among the workers' leaders, even the revolutionary ones.

There is little to be said of the peasant movement. It is true that peasants take part in the conferences of the Workers' and Peasants' Party, and that there was a strong peasant movement in one district of Bardoli; but on the whole the peasantry is controlled by the Ghandists, and has not yet taken up the fight.

It is one of the most important tasks of the Comintern to found an Indian Communist Party. The Workers' and Peasants' Party, as the Sixth Congress declared, is not the right organisation to lead the tremendous mass movement. In the near future in India still greater revolutionary movements will take place.

Summing up, we can say that the national bourgeoisie, in a number of colonial countries, has learnt the lesson of the Chinese revolution. In India, Indonesia and Korea the national reformist bourgeoisie has turned to the right, towards a rapprochement with imperialism. The attitude towards the Soviet Union has become an object of barter for the national bourgeoisie. It is true that the National Swarajist Congress passed a resolution against war on the Soviet Union, but at the same time they say: we are open to a deal; give us something and we shall carry on war against the U.S.S.R. The classic example of this attitude was seen in Egypt, where the Wafd leader, Nahas Pasha, declared: England will carry on war against the Soviet Union; we shall not support England unless we get something in return. If we get something, then we shall support England.

The working class movement in the colonies is growing; the workers' struggle against imperialism and against the national bourgeoisie is becoming more intense. I think that even from this brief survey we can state that the Sixth World Congress was correct in describing the world situation as one in which the contradictions between imperialism and the Soviet Union, between the imperialist states, between imperialism and the colonial countries, and also class contradictions in the separate countries, were growing stronger and more acute.